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Abstract 
Computer security is a requirement of modern business. Intrusion Detection Sys­
tems are an essential part of that security. Several types of IDS must be used to 
ensure a maximal monitoring. Moreover, autonomous agents working together to 
evaluate threats is a promising idea. Therefore, it is natural to integrate IDS and 
agents into a coherent system with a single point of control. Current AAFID's evo­
lution could lead to a framework where such an integration is made easier. Part of . 
this evolution is due to the new communication mechanism based on events. 
V 
Foreword 
This dissertation is divided in two parts. The first part is an introduction to com­
puter security and security tools. It was not meant to be an extensive description 
of computer security. Its purpose is to place Intrusion Detection Systems in their 
context. 
The second part devoted to IDS, and mostly to AAFID. While I was in Purdue, 
I was given the opportunity to work on it. My first modifications were mostly bug 
fixes, but the later could not be merged into the main code without many other 
adaptations. Therefore, I will also explain why such a change was needed, how it 
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1. Introduction to Computer Security 
In today's Information Society, we have become dependent on the rapid flow of 
and easy access to data. Computers play a central role in this scheme. They can 
manage huge amount of information and networks make access to remote fi.les easy 
and transparent. It seems we can not live without such an infrastructure. 
1 .1 . Privacy and I ntegrity of Data and Computers 
Information is an interesting concept. It may be duplicated at no cost, yet some 
people may be willing to pay to have it. Many organisations' business is to collect, 
process and sell information. So, although information does not look like any other 
goods, it seems it can behave in similar ways. 
Information can be attacked in two ways. First it can be destroyed or corrupted. 
Secondly it can be copied. This means the original owner may fmd it harder to sell 
it. In both cases, the value of this information is lower, maybe null. It is thus 
natural for organisations to try to protect their data. 
In addition some kind of information (private information, for instance) is sub­
ject to legal restriction regarding their use. This is common in many countries. One 
typical restriction is that the information cannot be made public. 
Computers being the key to information, they are also at risk. Their behaviour 
can be changed to allow easier access to restricted data to an opponent. Or some­
one can try to make them stop operating to interrupt the business that depends 
on them. Potentially worse, one could use these computers to attack another or­
ganisation. Even if legally the owner of these computers is not Hable, retaliation 
is a common practice. Finally, the owner could be held responsible for any kind of 
illegal contents found on his computers. 
No one is safe in this game. Because computers must be inter-connected in order 
to be useful today, all are a potential target. Therefore security is mandatory. 
But what is Computer Security? [26] presents it as the realization of confiden­
tiality, integrity and availabilityin a computer system. But this definition needs to 
be expanded. 
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1.2. Security Policy 
The first step to protect the system is to use appropriate tools to enforce any ac­
cess restrictions needed. Identification, authentication and non-repudiation are 
best left to computers. Most of the time, operating systems already in use in the 
organisation provide such mechanisms. It is necessary to make sure that these 
mechanisms are complete with regard to the privacy and integrity of data. 
Of course, the security level should balance with the burden imposed on users. 
If the users feel the need to bypass any security in order to work, then the level 
may be to high. 
The next step is to make the whole system secure. [8] defines a secure system 
as one that can be depended upon to behave as it is expected to. So the first step 
is to state and formalize this behaviour. Or, as [15] says it: 
The expected behavior is formalized into the security policy of the com­
puter system and governs the goals that the system must meet. 
This policy allows to make assumptions about the level of security offered by 
the system, such as resistance to brute force attacks and to various spoffing attacks. 
1 . 3. Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities are defined by [15] as functional defects that could result in viola­
tion of the security policy. I would rather first define a vulnerable system as the 
one that allows a violation, then try to identify the flaw that caused that violation 
according to the following classification: 
2 
Design flaws 
This category groups weak algorithms and softwares written with no concern 
for security. They cannot enforce security and should not be used for this. 
An important fact about security algorithms (such as encryption) is that most 
of them will be weak one day or another. No one would use Enigma coding for 
any serious purpose, although it proved to be very good. Modern algorithms 
are also being studied, and new methods to crack them are being found. This 
means that the assumptions we can do on software (such as " it would take 
billions of years to break this algorithm ") may become suddenly wrong. Yet, 
those assumptions are what we use to implement a security solution. 
Trying to fix the problem can be harder than changing the tool. This also is 
true for softwares initially written without security. Ad ding it afterwards is 
always a tricky task. 
1.4. Intrusions 
Implementation flaws 
This category groups all defects in software (bugs) resulting in a difference 
between the expected functionality and the actual behaviour. The only way 
to fix it is to change the source code and recompile. Of course, if the source 
code is not available, the user must wait for an upgrade from the author. If 
he is unavailable, then that flaw cannot be fixed. 
It is important to remember that a functional defect in some software does 
not imply a vulnerability. Only those that could result in a violation of the se­
curity policy regarding the confidentiality, integrity or availability of computer 
systems are vulnerabilities. 
Use flaws 
This last category groups mistakes that can be made when using security tools, 
such as misconfiguration or weak passwords. A simple change in the way the 
tools are used is enough to fix the flaw. 
I mention them because too often people rely on a security tool without un­
derstanding its limit or the potential weakness that result from its interaction 
with other tools. No tool operates alone. The global behaviour must be ob­
served with care. 
These kinds of flaws may result in exploitable vulnerabilities. When there is no 
way to fix the flaw, other measures must be taken in order to restore the security 
level, as we will see later. 
1 .4. Intrusions 
Intrusions are security policy violations. In short, it means that the security tools 
supposed to enforce this policy are not working. This definition is compatible with 
the one found in [11 J, where an intrusion is 
any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confiden­
tiality, or availability of a resource. 
and the one of [1], 
the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized attempt to 
• access information, 
• manipulate information or, 
• render a system unreliable or unusable. 
Although some authors use a very detailed list of different intrusions, 1 will use 
the simple one given in [15]. 
3 
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• Misuse intrusion 
This kind of intrusion uses the vulnerabilities in the security tools in order 
to break into the computers. They can be recognized by the fact that the 
observed events do not follow any logic. But most of the time, it is easier to 
use the vulnerability signatures (that is, the set of operations one must use 
to exploit the vulnerability) to spot misuse intrusions. 
• Anomaly intrusion 
What happens when the attacker is using someone else's password? Or if he 
is a regular user who suddenly misbehaves? The problem here is that proper 
authentications have been given. Yet something wrong is going on. We will 
see later what can be done about these. 
1 . 5. Security through Obscurity 
Many people think secrecy is important to security. This is often referred to as 
Security through Obscurity, and means that the less we let others know about the 
security tools, the more secure they are. Therefore the algorithms and the source 
code are not published. This sounds like a good idea, but it actually is not. 
1.5.1. Why it does not work 
The main assumption this idea uses is that if the algorithms and the source code 
are not available, no one will be able to reverse engineer them. It has been proven 
wrong so many times that it is surprising some people may still believe in it. 
Sooner or later (and it tends to be sooner these days), someone will understand 
the inner working of both the algorithms and the software. What happens then? Is 
the security mechanism enforced by this software in any way compromised? It de­
pends. If the actual security was the secrecy of the algorithm, then yes, definitely. 
If it is found that a weak algorithm was used, or that defects were hidden in the 
code, again, yes. If not, then the software is just as secure as it used to, not less. 
But if there is no gain to keep an algorithm secret, why do it? More importantly: 
if a weak algorithm is used because the author has not the knowledge to implement 
proper security algorithm, public review will spot it. This in turn will force the 
author to remove the weak algorithm, otherwise the software will not be used. 
The same applies to the source code. Peer review can help to spot and fix the 
defects that could result in vulnerabilities. 
It is in fact surprising that so many people trust softwares that have not been 
reviewed (either by independent specialists under a N.D.A, or by every one as in 
the Open Source system). As one anonymous administrator once said 
N ever trust a program you don't have the source code for. 
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1 . 5. 2. When it cou Id work 
1. 6. Softwares' Ecology 
But secrecy could work sometimes. As a matter of fact, passwords are kept secret 
in the head of the users (no other place is appropriate). So where is the border 
between the useful secrecy and the harmful one? 
The passwords' case is quite simple. We saw that secrecy in software was not 
efficient because of reverse engineering. But there is no way to investigate one 
user's brain that way (at least, not yet). So hiding a secret where it cannot be 
investigated is good. A binary only software cannot hide anything. 
Another important issue is time. The reverse engineering process can take some 
time (but that time can be as short as one day). Therefore using such an approach 
for timely protection can be effective, maybe more than effective than a costly but 
more robust solution. 
Finally, secrecy can be used to confuse attackers, or increase the risk of attacks. 
For instance, configuring a server so that it uses another port would force any at­
tacker to probe all the ports to fmd it. With modern scanners this is not hard to do. 
But monitors could have been put on other ports, and the scanning will be seen. 
Any good cracker knows it and would not take the risk. 
1 . 6. Softwares' Ecology 
Softwares behave like living beings in some respects. When a vulnerability is found 
in a specifi.c tool, all systems using that tool are at risk. Vulnerabilities are just like 
predators for a given species. Software's code can also been seen as DNA, with 
families and lineage. Using software coming from a single source can be effective 
from a management point of view, but is a disaster waiting to happen for security. 
Recent problems with the Melissa macro virus are a good example.' 
The best way to prevent such an issue is to mix various softwares and operating 
systems, so that if one part ever becomes vulnerable, everything else will still work. 
Another problem is the inter-relationships between different computers in a 
system. Once one is compromised, the integrity of other computers are at risk. A 
vulnerability in just one tool is like a wound that could let to infect the whole or­
ganism. Unfortunately, the only way to prevent this is to configure each computer 
so that it does not trust the others, even when located in the same room. This is 
not a real solution, because of the hassle it would be for users. 
1 . 7. Planning 
The best way to prevent intrusion is to be prepared for it. First, the security offi­
cer or the administrator should review every security mechanism and ask himself 
what would happen if they were compromised. In doing so, he can find that the 
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configuration could be changed to lower permissions or that other tools could be 
used to reinforce security, without adding any burden for users. 
This operation has to be done on a regular basis, just to make sure that the 
proper balance between security and users' burden has been achieved. 
Then he should ask himself what to do when an intrusion has been done. To 
spot it is of course mandatory. It would be dramatic if an unauthorized user was 
allowed to use the system, and changes its behaviour without being noticed. A 
constant or regular monitoring of the system audit trails as well of other system's 
variables are just a first step in this direction. 
The reaction to such an intrusion must be carefully thought. Restauration of 
business is part of it and numerous books on general resources management will 
provide methods to plan it. 
But they may leave out some important issues: the local laws may define com­
puter intrusion as a crime, so the victim may want to contact law enforcement 
agencies to bring the attack to justice. When prosecution is not an option (maybe 
the intruder was operating from another country where there is no concept of com­
puter crime), the law enforcement agencies are still useful to investigate the case, 
identify the vulnerabilities used in the attack, and possibly provide some hints 
about the identity of the intruder. His identity can be used to warn his access 
provider about his wrong doings and most of the time the provider will take some 
action of his own. So, in all cases, those agencies should be called, even if it is only 
for their technical knowledge (law enforcement agencies have or will soon have 
such a knowledge in most European and American countries). 
Another issue is public relation: the public (and shareholders maybe) could have 
concerns about the ability of the organisation to continue its operations. The pub­
lic relation department of the organisation is the best suited to prevent those con­
cerns, but will only be effective if it was informed. 
Finally, sharing any knowledge gained alter this attack (for instance, a new 
vulnerability) with the Security Community should be considered. If every vic­
tim shared this information with everyone, others could prevent an attack and the 
world would be a safer place. This is what is done in the anti-virus industry and it 
has proven to be good for both this industry and the users. Again, the law enforce­
ment agencies can provide help for this, because they are likely to know where to 
put this information. 
1 .8.  Users' Education 
Users should be part of the solution, not part of the problem. This is also true 
with security. Viruses and Trojan horses are too often brought in by unsuspecting 
users. Teaching them about security to increase their awareness is probably the 
most important aspect of computer security. They should understand the reasons 
for authentication and know how to create good passwords, how to identify and 
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deal with suspect contents and more generally how to reinforce security themselves 
by monitoring the system during their day-to-day activities. 
1 . 9. Conclusion 
One important aspect of computer security to keep in mind is that perfect security 
is a myth. As Professor Gene Spafford once said: 
" The only system that is truly secure is one that is switched off and 
unplugged, locked in a titanium safe, buried in a concrete vault on the 
bottom of the sea and surrounded by very highly paid armed guards. 
Even then I wouldn't bet on it. "1 
One could argue that this system is not very useful. It is rather hard to use. 
So no matter what we do, the resources are always at risk. This is no different 
than any other kind of resources. A building could always be destroyed by an 
earthquake (even if it is unlikely). We can reduce risk, not suppress it. The lower 
the risk, the higher we pay. 
1 I use to think that a destroyed system was quite secure, until I learned that a hard-disk smashed 
to pieces, although unusable, could give back huge amounts of information. 
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chapterSecurity's Tool-box 
There is a wide variety of tools a security officer can use to increase the security 
level of his system. The following classification is an attempt to present these tools 
in a short and informative way. 
1 .1 0. Static Security 
Static security includes all tools whose purpose is to block attacks by protecting 
the security policy. These tools are said to be static because they do not handle 
intrusions, they just try to prevent them. 
1 .1 0 .1 . Operating System 
Any good operating system must provide a basic authentication and security mech­
anisms. Multi-users operating systems offer some kind of property and access per­
missions concept. On these systems, one user must authenticate himself before he 
can use the computer. 
The kind of operating system should be chosen according to security require­
ments. For instance, if a very high level of security is needed, a system that can 
produce detailed audit trails is better than one that cannot. 
It should be noted that most of the time an operating system as shipped by 
the producer is very insecure. All the default configuration parameters must be 
reviewed and possible changed. There is a trend towards more sensible defaults, 
but double-checking is always a good idea2 . 
It is important to remember that passwords have a limited impact when remote 
login is allowed. This is because the default method to send passwords is in plain­
text, and that it is very easy to listen to any broadcast media (such as Ethernet) for 
specific information (such as passwords). 
1 .1 0. 2. Cryptography 
Cryptography has many uses in security. Here is a short list of them: 
• one-way encryption3 of passwords, to prevent their recovery by anyone. 
• encryption over insecure channels. 
• encryption of data to raise the level of security (so that even if an intruder has 
access to a file, he still cannot read it). 
2The only sensible defaults are to close everything and to permit console access to the sysadmin 
only. lt takes longer to configure a system that way, but the result is much better. 
30ne-way encryption is a function that cannot be inversed. 
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password I I.__ _ __, ._ _ __, 
jpassword 1 
copy of the packet 
with the password 
encrypted data 
.__ _ _.I I.______. .__ _ _, ._ _ __, 
new encrypted data 
Figure 1. 1.: Replay attack scenario 
1 . 1 0. Static Security 
Legitlmate user 
• non-repudiation, with signatures, to make sure any action can be traced back 
to their author. 
• prevention of corruption or modification of data, either by signing the data, 
or a stamp (produced by a hash function). 
Cryptography should be used with care. Its only goal is to make it hard to un­
derstand what has been encrypted without the proper key. The following scenario 
shows a case where cryptography is totally useless (see figure 1. 1): 
• the communication between the server and the user's computer is encrypted 
using the server's public key, 
• the cracker records the encrypted communication, 
• he connects to the server, and when asked for the a password, simply sends 
the copied packet where this passwords must be. 
This is known as the Replay Attack. It can be done because the cracker has not 
need to decrypt the password. If a new key is used for each new connection, this 
attack is useless . 
Correctly used, cryptography can greatly increase the security a of system. Gen­
erally, it should be used for every remote connection. 
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It is rather unfortunate that there so many political obstacles to the widespread 
use of cryptography. 
1.1 O. 3. Firewall 
Firewalls are most often seen as the last line of defense (which they are not) because 
of their power. They are used to filter network packets based on some properties 
of these packets. These properties include origin, destination (IP address and/or 
port) , protocol, nature, and contents. Sorne firewalls are able to group IP frag­
ments and can then investigate the TCP packet . More elaborated ones can even 
understand a broad range of protocols and make their decision based on very high 
level consideration. 
The filtering can be to reject, log, forward, duplicate or any other action. Thus 
firewalls can be used for various tasks, such as gateway (between an hidden network 
and the Internet). So much, as a matter of fact, that a whole book could (and many 
times had been) devoted to the subject. 
Yet that flexibility is also a drawback. lt is quite easy to misconfigure a firewall 
and prevent legitimate traffic, or allow data to leak. 
1 .1 0 .4. Vulnerabilities Scanner 
Vulnerabilities scanners are a very important kind of tools that everyone serious 
about security should use often. They can detect various problems, either func­
tional defects in software or misconfigurations. 
They should be used even for no other reason than because intruders will use 
them against the system. 
Of course, the main problem with them is that they must be updated to be ef­
fective. And they only include known vulnerabilities. Even though it may seem 
obvious, it should be kept in mind that some people may know about a vulnera­
bility for a long time before it becomes public. 
1 . 1 1 . Active Security 
The tools presented so far try to prevent intrusions but are rather useless once an 
intruder has found his way into the system. The following class of tools deals with 
this. 
An intrusion is an hide and seek game. The security officers, helped by the 
system, try to find the intruder, while the later do his best to leave no trace. In 
this game, the timing is very important. Being able to detect an intrusion as soon 
as it started is always better than having to understand la ter what happened. 
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1 .11 .1 . Entrapment System 
The security officer has an edge over intruders because he knows how the system 
is configured. If he uses vulnerabilities scanners (and he should), he also knows 
where the system can be attacked. 
Entrapment systems are programs that reproduce a vulnerability, but that are 
not exploitable. Once installed on the system, they will respond to scanning the 
same way the vulnerability they simulate . They have the same signature as the 
vulnera bility. 
If an intruder tries to exploit them, he may think he has found a breach but the 
programs will just record his activities (and other parameters). It is ideal to catch 
script kiddies" . 
They are different from general Intrusion Detection Systems (see below) because 
of their relatively limited area of action. 
1 .11 . 2. 1 ntrusion Detec:.tion System 
Finally, what can be done when everything else has failed? The intruder may know 
the configuration of his target (including the traps), he may have a password, and 
is about to do some damage. 
Intrusion Detection Systems take this possibility into account. They are the last 
line of defense of a system. I include virus scanners in this category. 
The next chapters are entirely dedicated to these tools. 
4Wanabee crackers who lack the elementary knowledge about security and who use cookbook 
methods to break in. 
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Static security is like a door. It will only stop the opponent long enough so that 
the opponent will be spotted. This is what I DS are for. 
This chapter uses case studies to hi-light the specific features of each kind of 
system. The next one introduces a specific architecture. 
2 .1 . Kind of threats 
Here we return to the kind of intrusions as defined in [15] , and outline the nature 
of I DS targeted at these intrusions. 
2 .1 .1 . M isuse 
Misuse is plain violation of security policy. That is, the exploitation of a vulnera­
bility is the system. Of course, vulnerabilities should be fixed as soon as they are 
found, but sometimes it cannot be done. For this reason, many IDS have been 
designed to detect such violation. 
What kind of information is available? A vulnerability can be ex:ploited by a se­
quence of actions. Once the vulnerability has been properly studied, this sequence 
can be known ([15] refers to it as the signature of the vulnerability). 
Different operating systems generate different amount of audit events for each 
action they carry on. The range is from nothing to a detailed list of every parameter 
of the operation. So a vulnerability can be formalized as the list of audit events it 
generates. 
2.1.2. Anomaly 
Anomaly intrusion is more vicious. In this case, the intruder has a legitimate pass­
word (maybe the intruder is a legitimate user), so he does not have to break the 
system. 
How can we say that something wrong is going on? The only way to detect that 
kind of intrusion is to detect a variation in the behaviour of the user (from the 
system's point of view, anyone with a legitimate password is a legitimate user). 
Here are the main techniques to detect these anomaly intrusions. 
1 3  
2. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Statistical approach 
A profile is defined by a set of measures . Periodically, the system generates a 
value that measures the abnormality of the profile. This value is a function of the 
abnormality values of each measures in the profile. For instance a simple function 
could be a weighted sum of the squares of the individual abnormality values. 
Such an approach is interesting because statistics is a well studied area, whose 
complete tool box can be used here. 
But there are some drawbacks: 
• the order of events is irrelevant for the profile 
• graduai modifications of the profile can change it to allow behaviour that used 
to be regarded as abnormal 
• the threshold above which an anomaly is considered intrusive may be hard to 
define. If it is too low the number of false positives will rise. If it is too high 
the number of false negatives will rise. 
More information on such systems can be found in [19]. 
Bayesian Classification 
I DS using Bayesian classification are able to determine the most probable numbers 
of classes and to calculate the probabilistic membership function of each datum 
(element of data) in the classes (see [3]). 
This is a very recent approach and it has not yet been extensively tested. 
Neural Networks 
In this case, the neural network is trained on a sequence of commands. The input 
of the net is the current command, and the past w commands. Once the neural 
network is trained on a set of representative command sequences of a user, it is 
considered to be the profile of the user. The fraction of incorrectly predicted com­
mands represents the variance of the user behaviour from his profile ( [7] ). 
Neural networks are known to cope well with noisy data. But they can be very 
slow to converge. 
2 .  2 .  1 DS Architectures 
There are severals way to collect the data for an IDS . Each offers a balance between 
scaling, and the precision of the information. 
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2. 2. IDS Architectures 
2.2.1 . Host based IDS 
A host base IDS monitors just one computer. This means the events it collects are 
all generated on that computer. 
An instance of that kind of IDS is ASAX. This system is described in [21] (there 
are many other documents. Please see the bibliography). 
ASAX was a research project of the Computer Department of the Notre-Dame 
de la Paix University, and Siemens S.A, Namur, Belgium. It is targeted on misuse 
vulnerabilities and uses a Turing-complete language (RUSSEL) to describe vulnera­
bility signatures. This language can be considered as a query language on the audit 
trails. 
Audit trails are first translated by a Format Adaptor into a portable format be­
fore they are feeded to the RUSSEL engine. The later activates rules at the ini­
tialisation, and these rules can activates other rules on specific events. The set 
of activated rules represents potential attacks that the engine investigates. The 
engine has been designed so that the activation of a rule is just an allocation of 
memory (from the heap) for its parameters. 
Static auditing (verification of the configuration) can be done in real time by 
ASAX. It uses a declarative language to mimic the reasoning of an attacker trying 
to find holes in the configuration. The result is a facts database that can be used to 
update the rules. The RUSSEL engine triggers the reasoning process when an audit 
record relative to the modification of a security configuration file is encountered. 
Experiments show that it could be used in real time on real life systems with 
minimal burden. 
Disadvantages 
• A single host is most of the time nothing but a small part of a larger system. 
Any intruder will target the system as a whole rather than a host (this is a 
general drawback of every host-based IDS) . 
• To write attack patterns specifications, one has first to learn RUSSEL, while it 
may be easier with other tools. 
• A monolithic IDS is the first target of an intruder. 
2.2.2. Multi-hosts based 
A network is a bit more than the sum of its hosts. An intrusion can be invisible 
when seen from any host, but obvious from the network. 
But the hosts are still the places where things happen. This is were the audit 
trails are generated. 
Therefore, one must define a way to collect information on hosts and to process 
it globally. 
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Distributed ASAX, described in [21] and [22] implements this simply. On each 
host, the audit processing is used to filter interesting events. An Audit State Con­
troller can be used to alter the granularity level used by the auditing m.echanism. 
The Format Adaptor translates the audit events for the Evaluator. 
Filtered events are then sent to a central host where a second level processing 
can be done and where the Console is running. This Console is used to configure 
and control the whole system. The Central Evaluator is in no way different than 
the other evaluator . 
The communication is implemented with PYM. 
It is obvious that this is a natural extension of ASAX, whose independence to 
the format of audit trails allows such a multi-levels analysis. 
2.2.3. Network based 
It seems that a multi-hosts based IDS can monitor every aspects of a system. That 
is, as long as the goal of the attacker is to break into the system. But denial of 
services do no require such an intrusion. 
As a matter of fact, there are several kind of attacks that can only be discovered 
by monitoring the network. But traditional tools are not able to process such an 
amount of data. A new kind of IDS located between the firewall and the Internet 
is used for this purpose. 
Shadow ( [13]) is a IDS specifically designed for network analysis. It was able to 
spot new attack patterns such as coordinated probings and exploits from multiple 
hosts (possibly from different networks or even countries). 
The setup of Shadow is simple: 
• a sensor, located between the firewall and the Internet collects information 
on packets (by using tcpdump). 
• inside the firewall, an analysis station performs the actual monitoring. 
• the only way to access the sensor through the firewall is by using a secure 
shell to copy the data between the sensor and the 
• the analysis station is configured to fetch the data from the sensor every hour. 
On the analysis station, a number of filters is used to find attack patterns in the 
data . The data is kept for several days, so it is possible to investigate suspicious 
activities that were not initially seen. 
Evaluation 
A network-based IDS provides valuable information about the attackers. It can 
detect various probes and forged packets. Moreover, when a computer suddenly 
crashes, the only way to understand what happened is to used the network data. 
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But the analysis is very hard. It requires a deep understanding of the protocols. 
Any mistake in the configuration of the analysis station will result in very high 
number of false negatives or false positives. 
Finally, the sensor's  location (outside the firewall) allows attacks from the in­
side. 
2. 3. Reactive or Proactive IDS 
How much reactive or proactive an IDS should be? My answer is that an IDS should 
not perform any kind of actions other than raising an alarm. This is based on the 
following three step reasoning: 
1. any IDS has false positives. 
2. in case of false positive, a legitimate user (and possibly a customer) will be 
the target of the reacting IDS. 
3. " the last thing you want is to blow away a legitimate customer. " [25] 
A more elaborated answer can be found in [24]. 
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3 .  Autonomous Agents 
lt is easy to see a major problem with monolithic intrusion detection systems: once 
the program stops, there is no monitoring anymore. An intruder knowing that such 
an IDS is in operation on the computer he wants to attack is likely to do his best 
to fool or crash the IDS. 
Other kinds of structure should be looked for to solve this problem. looked for. 
[5] proposes the use of autonomous agents. By agents, we mean 
a group of free-running processes which can act independently of each 
other and the system. ( [5]) 
The basic architecture should look like in figure 3. 1 .  We see that agents com­
municate with each other and the triggering of an intrusion alarm is the result of a 
collaboration between agents, each of them raising the level of a global intrusion 
risk factor. 
No agent is mandatory. If one of them fails, the others are still able to monitor 
the system. The resulting architecture is much more flexible and foolproof than the 
monolithic design. 
Agents 
Figure 3. 1 . :  Communication as described in [5] 
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3 .1  . Genetie Algorithms 
As [5] suggests the use of a genetic algorithm to train the agents, I will first intro­
duce this technique. 
The Genetie Algorithm FAQ presents it as 
. . .  a model of machine learning which derives its behavior from a metaphor 
of some of the mechanisms of evolution in nature. 
Its purpose is to find an optimum to some function. 
It uses the concept of population where individuals are described by elementary 
words (such as chromosomes in real life), the coding. 
To select promising individuals, one must define a fitness fonction for each pos­
sible individual. In fact this is the function we want to optimize. 
We start with a randomly filled population, and do the following operations for 
a given number of generation: 
evaluation: apply the fitness function to each individual. 
reproduction: a fitness-proportionate reproduction is then applied. Most promis­
ing individuals' coding tends to influence the new individuals more than less 
promising ones. 
mutation: some individuals are stochastically modified. This ensures that no infor­
mation is lost by always allowing any coding to be inserted. 
iteration: the old population is discarded 
Although simple, this method can be quite effective. Even though it looks like 
a random search its use of past solutions to evaluate the present ones allows it to 
converge quickly. 
3 .  2 .  Genetie Algorithms in Autonomous Agents 
The idea that we could use genetic algorithms to create agents able to recognize 
attacks patterns without having to hard code these patterns (maybe these patterns 
are not completely known) is a natural one. 
Yet, it may be hard to do. First, we must select the coding. To give agents more 
flexibility, some kind of language must be used. Each elementary word could be a 
syntactic element of that language, with place-holders for child elements. More­
over, the syntactic and semantic correctness of the structure must be guaranteed 
somehow1 . This can be achieved either by using a very weakly typed language or 
1 It is true that we could use the fitness function to filter out incorrect codings but reproductions 
and mutations are likely to produce more incorrect codes than correct ones, so the convergence 
may be too slow. 
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by using a language syntactically so simple that it is hard to create an incorrect 
program. The later can be done by using words to represent complex operations. 
But it means that a lot of effort has to be put in defining these words to make this 
language as complete as possible with regard to the task2 • 
It is clear that such a coding is a tree, not a simple sequence. The reproduc­
tion process must be designed according to this structure. And because each node 
has more importance than the leaves (because the execution is governed by these 
nodes), a weight-based mixing may be needed. 
Finally the agents can only be evaluated when working together. So either we 
train them to recognize a part of an attack (but then it may be easier to hard code 
that part) or we train them as a whole (and we have some kind of extended coding 
composed of each agent's coding). In the later case, what would happen if the 
genetic algorithm converged so well that the agents stopped working properly if 
one of them was missing? We would have lost the advantages (at least one of 
them) of having autonomous agents. 
Therefore we see here that even though genetic algorithms sound very interest­
ing to automatically train agents, it is unclear whether this can be achieved. 
3 .  3 .  c;A5sA1A: Genetie Algorithms with a twist 
Another way to use genetic algorithms is to identify a specific attack. Here, po­
tential attacks are our population and the evolution process is used to select the 
most likely attack hypothesis. In this case, the attacks patterns are well known, 
and there is a finite number of them. 
This is the basis for c;A5SAJA (Genetie Algorithm for Simplified Security Audit 
Trails Analysis), as described in [20]. 
3.3.1. Problem 
To formalize the problem, we have: 
• NE the number of audit events and N0 the number of potential known attacks, 
• AE an Nf x N0 attacks-events matrix which gives the set of events generated 
by each attack. 
• R, a N0-dimensional weight vector, where R,;, (R,;, > 0) is the weight associated 
with the attack i. 
• 0, a Nf-dimensional vector where Oi counts the number of events of type i 
present in the audit trail (O is called " observed audit vector "). 
2 1 don't expect such a language to be Turing complete. 
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• H, a N0-dimensional hypothesis vector, where Hi = 1 if the attack i is present 
according to the hypothesis, and Hi = O otherwise. 
The problem is thus to find H that maximizes R x H, subject to the constraint 
(AE.H\ :::; ai, (1 :::; i :::; N0) .  This is a zero-one integer programming problem, thus 
NP-complete. 
3. 3 . 2. Solution 
Individuals are hypotheses and the fitness fonction is 
with T the number of audit events for which (AE.H)i > ai, f3 the slope of the 
penalty fonction, and a a parameter allowing elimination of too unrealistic hy­
potheses (a negative fitness value is equaled to O and the corresponding hypothesis 
is discarded). 
3 .3 . 3 .  Results 
This prototype has been tested on an AIX system, with 24 attacks, 28 audit events 
and 4 users. The audit trails are filtered in one pass into user-by-user audit vector 
limited to 30 minutes. The time limit is needed because if the audit trail is too 
long, the algorithm converges on the N0-dimensional unit vector. 
For this situation, the maximum fitness value converges after about 20 genera­
tions and the average fitness value is about 99% of the maximum fitness after 100 
generations. So the convergence is very fast. 
Of course, the test system is a minimalist one. An experiment on a real system 
has still to be done. 
3 . 3 .4. Disadvantages 
While this algorithm is very promising, it has some drawbacks: 
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• it only works against known attacks 
• the absence of event is not taken in account 
• multiple realisations of the same attack for a given user are not detected (be­
cause of the use of a binary coding) 
• multiple attacks can share audit events, in which case the optimum fitness is 
not reached 
3. 3. cA5SA1A: Genetie Algorith
ms with a twist 
• GAsSA1A is just an alarm, and th
e precise attack has then to be located in the 
audit trails. 
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4. AAFID: Autonomous Agents For 
Intrusion Detection 
AAFID is an ongoing research project of the CERIAS (Center of Education and Re­
search on Information Assurance and Security) of the University of Purdue, West­
Lafayette, I N  USA. The current version (public-alpha-04) was released September 
28th, 1998, but a new version (probably public-alpha-07) should be released in 
September 1999 . 
Its purpose is to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of a distributed agents 
based Intrusion Detection System. It is based on [5] ,  although it does not imple­
ment all the ideas developed in this paper (there is no genetic algorithm so far). 
The current version is documented in [2] ( other papers should follow soon and 
there are many texts included in the package). 
It is written in Perl because this language offers a good trade-off between speed 
and ease of use, and its very dynamic nature (code can be created at run time) 
makes it ideal for prototypes. 
I had the occasion to work on AAFID during my internship at Purdue (from 
September 1998 to January 1999). Here I explain what I did and why. 
4.1 . Architecture of AAFI D 
AAFID's architecture is described in [2] , and reproduced in short here. 
monitors are at the highest level. They provide the user with a graphical interface 
into the system. A monitor is directly called by the user. 
transceivers are simply relays between the monitors and the agents on a given host. 
Each transceiver runs on a single host. The are launched by a monitor when 
the user requests an agent to be executed on a host. The monitor first checks 
for a communication channel to a transceiver or another monitor. If there is 
one, it is sent a message to load the required entity. Otherwise the monitor 
first call the Starter program (using any remote activation system. Currently 
AAFID uses ssh.), then set a flag to indicate it is waiting for a connection 
from that host. The Starter instantiates a transceiver, contacts the monitor 
(through TCP) and redirects its standard input and output to the connection. 
25 
4. AAFID: Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection 
··-··-··-.. 
··-------.... ·-........ ·· ..... 
·-........ 
Legend 
■ Transceivers D Hosts 





Figure 4 .1 . : Physical represehtation of a sample IDS that follows AAFID architec­
ture (as in [2]) 
Then it runs the transceiver, which registers with its monitor. The later rec­
ognizes the former as the one in which an agent has to be started, and sends 
the appropriate commands to it. 
agents are launched by a transceiver. The agent is first loaded into the transceiver, 
and a new instance is created. Then a process is spawned to run the new 
instance. The agents communicate with their transceiver using Unix pipes. 
The communication is only clone between a parent and its child's (between a 
given process and the processes its spawned) . The figure 4.1 shows the whole 
structure. 
From this figure, it is quite obvious that the communication is vertical and 
mostly upward and that the hierarchy looks like a pyramid. 
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4. 2. Architecture of an AAFID agent 
Normal Agent's 
ope rations 
_...----1� Entity: :processlnput 
Message management functions 
Figure 4. 2 . :  Logical architecture of an AAFID agent 
The entities (agents, transceivers and monitors) communicates with each other 
by sending messages. A message is a line of tex:t (a line of tex:t is terminated by a 
newline character) with a specific format1 . 
In its current incarnation, AAFID is a framework in which various IDS are man­
aged, with a single point of control. 
4. 2 .  Architecture of an AAFI D agent 
An AAFID agent is simply a program taking commands from its standard input and 
sending messages on its standard output2 • This is useful for debugging purpose. 
The message management is done in Entity::processlnput, a huge function handling 
everything from simple message sending and receiving up to error management, 
including logging . This means that the semantic (i .e .  the format) of messages is 
defined in this function . 
The agent is supposed to call Entity::processlnput between other operations. 
These operations perform the actual monitoring. This architecture can be found in 
figure 4. 2 .  
An agent could be written in any language, but the actual ex:ecution mechanism 
is currently tied to Perl. 
1 The format is currently described in an unreleased paper. 
2When it is created by a transceiver, the Unix pipes used for communication are first redirected to 
the standard input and output. 
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4. 3 .  Communication is the key 
If we compare current's AAFID communication (see figure 4. 1 on page 26) with what 
is described in [5] (figure 3. 1 on page 19), it is clear that there is no horizontal 
communications (between agents). In order to provide communication between 
agents, a complete redesign of the communication mechanism is needed. Actually, 
this was part of the needed near-term work on AAFID. 
As we have seen, the problem with the current architecture is the lack of flex­
ibility in the message handler. This function achieve too much to do everything 
correctly and the management of errors and other unusual conditions is poor at its 
best. Sometimes the whole hierarchy of agents freezes because one of them does 
not answer anymore. As [2] puts it: 
If the communication between the entities is somehow disrupted, the 
system essentially stops working. 
My idea was that the use of several layers, with a central module monitoring 
events and triggering appropriate callback functions on each of them would give 
better granularity and flexibility. 
I designed this module (named the Reactor) to be able to respond to time and 
communication handles' conditions. Afterwards Diego Zamboni added support for 
file handles, and signais should follow soon. 
While designing the module, I kept in mind the saying 
" Mechanisms, no policy. " 
My perception is that AAFID's agents can be seen either as small IDS on their own, 
or as members of a group targeted towards a given attack pattern. By mixing these 
two views, we have an architecture like figure 4.3 on the facing page. In order 
to attain such a goal, there must be as few restrictions as possible on how to use 
the communication mechanisms. In particular, the semantic for messages is left 
to another layer (see below). In short, the Reactor's only purpose is to deliver 
messages without making any assumption about their format (for instance, the 
fact that a message is a line of text has been dropped) and to do it with as much 
reliability and flexibility as possible. 
Another module, the limer, provides an interface to Timer objects (see figure 4.4 
on the next page) that can manage a tasks list3 • The tasks can be added with a time 
(resolution of one second) at which they must be triggered. Removing a task is 
also supported. The source code can be found at page 41. The version AAFID uses 
includes repeating events, added by Diego Zamboni (not yet release). The actual 
execution of tasks must be done by the user of a limer object. 
3When I first wrote the Timer module, I called the tasks " events ". This is because I had timeouts 
in mind. So while I will talk about tasks in this document, the source code still refers to events, 
although events are only what trigger the tasks. 
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Legend 
Team of agents 
0 agent 
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Figure 4.  3. : Sample of organisation of agents 
Timer 
+new ( ) : cons tructor 
+add_event ( tirne : integer , func : function re ference ) 
+rernove_event ( tirne : integer , func : func tion re ference ) 
+get_when ( ) : integer 
+get_next ( ) : l i s t  
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+add_acceptor (handle : opaque , login : function reference , error : function reference)  
- - -
+destroy_handle (handle : opaque ) 
+remove_handle (handle : opaque ) 
+add_event ( time : integer, task : function reference)  - - - +remove_event ( time : integer , task : function reference ) 
+send_message (handle : opaque , message : string , error : function 
+loop ( )  
[Handle callbacks ] 
read : function reference 
close : function reference 
errer : function referenceread : function reference 





























4. 3. Communication is the key 
The Reactor uses the limer and provides an API to insert and remove tasks and 
communication handles to the system (see figure 4.5 on the facing page). These 
handles have been chosen because they are an ideal interface to a large number of 
communication concepts (such as pipes or sockets). The creation of handles is left 
to the caller of the Reactor, therefore any kind of handles can be used, with the 
exception of files. The management of these (an extension of Diego Zamboni, not 
yet released) is done by repeating tasks, and other measures are taken on specific 
conditions (such as when a file is truncated). Acceptor handles (communication 
handle through which a new connection can be made) are dealt with correctly. The 
source code can be found on page 44. 
4. 3 .1 . Conditions 
The Reactor's  main work is to check for various conditions (change of state) on the 
handles, as well as for time events. The work done on each condition is shown 
below. 
Read conditions 
On a read condition on one handle, the Reactor::__read is called. It is written to be 
able to manage half-read messages properly. If there is no current message for the 
given handle, it first blocks to read the 4 bytes size4 of the new message, then tries 
to read as much as it can before returning. If the message has not been entirely 
read, it is first saved in a handle specific variable. If the message is complete, 
the read callback for this handle is called. If any errors are detected during the 
operations, the error callback for the handle is called. 
Write conditions 
Write conditions are only checked on handles for which there is a message waiting 
to be sent. On a write condition on one handle, the Reactor::_send is called. It 
takes the first entry of the messages queue for the handle, tries to write as much 
as it can to the handle, then removes the written part out of the message. If the 
message has been completely sent, it is removed from the messages queue. If there 
are not any more messages in the messages queue for this handle, the handle is 
remove from the writeh list (this list contains the handle the Reactor should check 
for write condition). If any errors are detected, the error callback for the handle is 
called. 
4this is the only place where a blocking read is done. But given the size , it should not be a problem 
except if less than 4 bytes are sent on purpose. 
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Error conditions 
The error is directly dispatched to the appropriate callba�k function. 
lime events 
The function implementing the previous checks for conditions is called to run for 
at most a given amount of "time. This amount is calculated so that the function's 
timeout occurs when the next set of tasks is to be triggered. When the function 
returns, the Reactor first checks whether any conditions are set on handles then 
checks if it is time to trigger the tasks. 
4.3 . 2 .  Sending messages 
The message to be sent is first prefixed with its size in network encoding format, 
then pushed into the messages queue for the given handle and the handle is added 
to the writeh list. The actual sending will be done by Reactor::....send on a write 
condition. 
4. 3 .3 .  Acceptors 
Acceptors are specific handles whose purpose is to receive connection requests. 
Acceptors handles are different because they are never written to and they never 
receive messages. lnstead, they can be connected to. From the Reactor's perspec­
tive, it looks like a read condition. The Reactor::....read function manages this by 
first checking if the handle is an Acceptor, and if it is, calling the login callback 
function for this handle. This way, Acceptor handles can be checked with other 
handles without hassle. 
4.3 .4. Reactor's loop 
The function named Reactor::loop is not a real loop. It is rather the place where the 
Reactor waits for anything to happen until the next task is triggered. If there is no 
task registered, the Reactor will simply check for any conditions on each handle in 
its lists (readh for reading, writeh for writing, and errorh for errors). So if nothing is 
expected to happen, it exits. The caller of this function should check for termination 
conditions each time Reactor::loop returns. 
The architecture of a program using the Reactor can be found in figure 4.6 on 
page 34. 
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4. 3. Communication is the key 
The Reactor does not completely replace the former mechanism, because it lacks 
the support for relay and logging and procedures activation. But I certainly did 
not designed it with this features in mind. Its main advantage is to provide easy 
and flexible support for configurable behaviour for each communication handle. It 
could be used for various other applications. 
Below, I will describe other extensions whose purpose is to provide these fea­
tures and possibly many more. 
4.3.6. Disadvantages 
In order to benefit from this structure, the Reactor::loop should be used as the 
application's main loop. This means agents are reactive instead of proactive. The 
lack of a good multithreads support in Perl makes it hard to mix handles monitoring 
and GUI management, except if the GUI library can manage all the pending events 
in a single function, returning as soon as no more events are available. 
The limer module cannot do hard real time. The tasks will not be triggered 
sooner than expected, but maybe later (because there is no easy way to suspend 
the execution at the appropriate time, so if the agent is doing some long processing 
of inputs, the task can only be activated once the processing is over, when the 
execution flow is in the Reactor::loop. Moreover, the resolution of one second 
cannot be changed easily. 
Finally, moving from a conventional agent to an event-based one is not simple. 
One has to clearly define the kind of input each handle should manage. 
4. 3. 7. Channels 
The Channel module's purpose is to provide an easier way to manage handles. By 
themselves, Channel objects are not really interesting. They just give an interface 
to an handle and use the Reactor for most of the work. This interface is described 
in figure 4. 7 on page 35 . 
The main reason to use them is for the Services that can be dynamically added 
to a Channel abject to change its behaviour. 
A Channel can also be an Acceptor. In this case, a login function is supplied to 
create a new handle for the connection and to register it to the Reactor. A function 
provided by the application is then called on the handle to perform any needed 
initialisation. 
The source code for the Channel module can be found page 5 7 .  
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H andles callback functions 
Reactor: :_read 
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Figure 4.6.: Logical architecture of an AAFID agent with the Reactor 




A Service is basically an extension for a Channel object. It can be called on each 
sent or received message for any purpose (including a modification). Sorne Services 
module are included (see figure 4.8 on page 36, and the source code on pages 52, 64, 
66 and 69), but these are just samples of what can be done with this mechanism. 
Services objects can be used to implement any kind of messages' semantic, on 
a per-handle basis. Moreover, various semantics can be shared on a given handle. 
Compared with the Entity::processlnput's approach, this is once again more flex­
ible. Since the exploration of the semantics of communication is a medium-term 
work, I think Services can provide a good foundation for it. 
Technical description 
Services should be able to be added to several Channels (the Services given as 
samples are able to do this). This way, a hierarchic configuration (one level for the 
Service , one for each Channel and one for each sent or received message) is possible. 
This configuration (named in the source code Service options) is simply a reference 
to a list of values. It can be given when a message is sent (in this case, it should 
have as first argument the name of the Service it is referring to) or be included 
in the received message (as a space separated list of values, with the name of the 
Service first, between braces { }, just before the actual message). In both case, the 
message is an implicit argument. 
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Channel 
-send_hookl : list  of strings = [ ]  
-send_hook2 : list  of strings = [ ]  
-read_hookl : string = 
-read_hook2 : string = . .  
+new (handle : IO : : Handle, read : function reference , close : function reference , error : function reference) : constructor 
+new_acceptor (handle : IO : : Handl e , login : func ref , error : func ref , new_read : func ref , new_close : func ref , new_error : func ref ) : constructor 
+send (message : string, . . .  : Services ' options=null )  
+get_mess_id ( ) : integer 
+destroy ( )  
+add service (service : Service)  
'T1 
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+new (name : string= " Empty" ) :  constructor 
+read ( channel : Channel , message : string ) : string 
+send ( channel : Channel , message : string , orig_message : string ) : string 
+activate ( channel : Channel )  
+deactivate ( channel : Channel )  
+close ( channel : Channel ) 
+error ( channel : Channel )  
+destroy ( channel : Channel ) 
� � � �� 
Service: : Ping 
+new (name : string= " Service : : Ping " ) :  constructor 
+read ( channel : Channel , message : string ) : string 
+activate ( channel : Channel )  
+deactivate (channel : Channel )  
+destroy ( channel : Channel ) 
-_ping ( channel : Channel )  
Service: :Trace 
+new (name : string= " Service : : Trace" ) :  constructor 
+read ( channel : Channel , message : string ) : string 
+send ( channel : Channel , message : string , orig message : string ) : string 
Service: :Ack 
+new (name : string= " Service : : Ack" ) : constructor 
+read ( channel : Channel , message : string, id : integer , ack : string=unde f ) : string 
+send ( channel : Channel , message : string, orig_message : string , timeout : integer , cbfunc : function 
+deactivate ( channel : Channel )  
+close ( channel : Channel )  
+destroy ( channel : Channel ) 
































4. 4. What is coming 
Services can do many things. When they are activated for a given Channel, they 
can request to be called for every message sent through the Channel or through the 
associated handle5 • They can also be called for a specific message. Likewise, they 
can be called automatically when a message is received, either for every message 
coming from the handle, or only for messages that have not bee.n removed by other 
Services. And as we just saw, a specific message can have Service options embedded 
in it. 
Sample Services 
These samples are just an illustration of the way Services work. 
Trace simply prints on the standard output the messages sent or received through 
the Channel. 
Ping makes sure the peer (the process at the other end of the handle) is still oper­
ating by sending ping messages to it if nothing is received on the handle for a 
given period of time. When the peer does not answer, a ping-timeout callback 
function is called (this function is defined by the Ping's user) . 
Ack guarantees a message has been properly received by the peer . The only case 
when a message can be lost is if the peer is suspended or locked in an infinite 
loop and never returns to the Reactor::loop. Of course, Ping should warn us 
if this happens, but it may do it after a very important message (the kind 
we do not want to loose) has been sent. Ack can be used to call a given 
callback function that takes a message as argument to provide a way to send 
the message somehow. This is actually a sample of message's semantic . 
4.4. What is coming 
So far, only the Reactor has been included in AAFID. According to Diego Zamboni, 
the other parts look promising but will not make it into the main code for the next 
public release. Yet I am confident that the whole communication mechanism offers 
about everything one could want with the proper level of flexibility. 
Yet, there are several features that could be added. Severa! of them (repeating 
events, support for files) have already been written by Diego Zamboni. One other I 
think would be worthwhile is the ability to configure the low level nature of a mes­
sage. Currently it is a string of characters prefixed by its size in network encoding. 
But other formats can be used by existing IDS and this feature will allow them to 
be integrated in the framework. 
5There is a difference because Services can generate traffic of their own. 
3 7  
4. AAFID: Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection 
Finally, the code does not require any Perl specific features, and could be rewrit­
ten in other languages quite easily6 • 
6 As a matter of fact, any typed language would make it easy. 
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5. Conclusion 
Intrusion Detection is without any doubt an essential part of any secure system. 
To be effective, various approaches must be used to cover all the possibilities . 
Practical requirements lead to opposite way. On one hand, small, specific IDS 
are easier to write and to test than one big monolithic application. On the other 
hand, a single point of control is mandatory. 
Therefore, a general framework where IDS can cooperate and be managed is 
ideal. Such a framework should support several kind of IDS, each of them with its 
own communication mechanism and configuration format. 
AAFID could be this framework. Even though this was not the original intent, 
AAFID has the potential to integrate different IDS into one coherent system. The 
current work on the flexibility of the communication mechanism is a big step to­
wards this goal. Services could be used to transparently translate messages' se­
mantic . 
This is a new approach to IDS. So far, intrusion detection techniques have been 
studied, but the cooperation between these techniques is still to be achieved. 
ASAX, with its format independent rules approach, could be the network moni­
tor such a framework is currently missing. 
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A. Source code 
A.1 . Timer.pm 
The Timer module implements a very simple tasks list and provides a few fonctions 
to insert and remove the tasks, and to activate the tasks at the correct time. 
# Package Timer 
# lmplements a queue for timed events. 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Timer.pm 
Timer - Timed event queue 
=headl  SYNOPSIS 
use Timer; 
$ti mer=new Timer; 
$timer->add_event(timeO+ 5, \&some_func); 
$nexLevents= $time->geLnextQ; 
$nexLtime=shift @$nexLevents; 
if ($nexLtime-timeO< =0) { 
} 




= over 4 
=item new ( )  
The constructor return a timer abject. 
= back 
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=over 4 
=item add_event ( TI ME, FU NC ) 
Add the task FUNC with the time TIME (given in seconds since 1 /1 /1 970). 
=item remove_event ( TI M E, FUNC ) 
Remove this task that was scheduled at time TIME. Both arguments must 
match those given to the add_event method. 
=item geLwhen ( )  
Return the time for the next events 
= item geLnext ( ) 
Return a list whose first element is the time of the events (that is, 
tasks) given as the other elements of the list. 
= back 
= headl CALLBACK PROTOTYPE 
=over 4 
= item task ( ) 
The task given to the timer cannot take any argument. 
=back 
=headl BUGS 
I hope not. 
=headl AUTHOR 





# my $timer = new Timer; 











A. 1 .  Timer. pm 
my ($self) = [ ] ;  




# $timer->add_event(timeQ + $tim
eout, \&tune); 
# Rem: 
# use closure if you want to pas
s arguments to the tunetion 
sub add_event { 
my ($self, $timeout, $func) = @_; 
my ($entry)= [$timeout, $func] ; 
push @$self, $entry; 
@$self = sort { return $$a[OJ < = >  $$b[OJ
 or $$a[1 ] < = >  $$b[1 ] ;  } @$self; 
} 
# Usage: 
# $timer-> remove_event($time, 
\ &tune); 
# both $time and \ &tune must matc
h the arguments given at add_eve
nt 
sub remove_event { 
my ($self, $timeout, $func) = @_; 
@$self=grep { $$_[0] ! = $timeout or $$_





# $next is a reference to a list : ($
time, \&tuncl, \&tunc2, . . . ) 
# with $time the Jowest time entry
 in the timer, and the correspond
ing 
# tunetion references 
sub geLnext { 
} 
my ($self) = @_; 
my ($timeout, @entries); 
return [ J unless @$self; 
$timeout= $$self[O] [OJ ; 
while ($$self[OJ [OJ = = $timeout) { 
my $entry = shift @$self; 
push @entries, $$entry[1 ] ;  
last unless @$self; 
} 
return [$timeout, @entries] ; 
# Usage: 
# $time = $timer->get_when0; 
# if $time = = undef, it means there's no 
more seheduled events. 
# $time is a absolute time that can b
e compared to timeQ. 
sub geL when { 
} 
my ($self) = @_; 
return undef unless @$self; 
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A.2 .  Reactor.pm 
The Reactor module is the low-level communication mechanism. It simply holds a 
list of file handlers and a task list (a Timer object). The main loop polls for events 
and activate the appropriate callback function for each of them. 
# Package Reactor 
# Poll a set of flle handles plus a event queue 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Reactor.pm 
Reactor - Poil a set of file handles plus a event queue 
=headl SYNOPSIS 
= head2 Server code 
use Reactor; 
use 10: :Handle; 
use 10::Socket; 
my $fha=new 10: :Socket: :UNIX(Local= > "toto", Listen=>1 ); 
sub idle_func { 
print " Idle function\n" ;  
Reactor: :add_event(timeO + 5,  \ &idle_func); 
} 
sub login { 
} 
my ($fh) = @_; 
my $nfh = $fh->acceptQ; 
Reactor: :add_handle($nfh,\&cb,\&close,\&error); 
sub cb { 
} 
my ($fh, $msg) = @_; 
if($msg eq "quit ") { 
} 
print "Received request to quit\n" ;  
unlink ("toto"); 
exit(O); 




sub close { 40 
my $fh =shift @_; 
44 
} 
print "Connection closed . \n" ; 
Reactor::destroy _handle($fh); 
sub error { 
my $fh = shift @_; 
print "Dainn ! Error on the line . \n" ; 
} 
Reactor::add_acceptor($fha,\&login,\&error); 
Reactor::add_event(time0+ 5 ,\&idle_func); 
while(l ) { 
Reactor: : loopQ; 
} 
= head2 Client Code 
use Reactor; 
use 10: : Socket; 
$fh = new 10: :Socket: :U N IX(Peer= > "tot
o"); 
while(l ) { 
print "Msg? (return f or quit) \n" ; 
} 
$ msg = <STD I N > ;  
chop $msg ;  
last if $ msg eq " " ;  
Reactor::send_message($fh,$ msg); 
Reactor::loopQ; 
last if $ msg eq "quit" ;  
= headl Interface 
lt has been assu med that an applicatio




A. 2. Reactor.pm 
use 10: :Select; 
use vars qw(%acceptor $ti mer %current %
fh_callbacks %fh_queues $ readh $writeh 
$errorh); 
use Timer; 
# Private variables 




# the event queue 
# maps the file handles to the callback fu
nctions 
# maps the file handles to the send que
ue 








A. Source code 
my $readh =new 10: :Seleet; 
my $writeh=new 10: :Seleet; 
my $errorh =new 10::Seleet; 
=over 4 
=item add_handle ( HAN DLE, FUNC, FUNC, FUNC ) 
Add the given handle to the reactor with the given funetions as a callbaek 
( order is ' read ' ,  ' close ' and ' error ' )  
=eut 
sub add_handle { 
} 
my ($fh , $ read, $close, $error)= @_; 
$ readh->add($fh); 
$errorh->add($fh); 
$fh_callbaeks{$fh } ->{ "read"}  = $read; 
$fh_callbaeks{$fh } ->{ "close" } =  $close; 
$fh_callbaeks{$fh } ->{ "error"}  = $error; 
=item add_aeceptor ( HAN DLE, FUNC, FUNC ) 
Add the given handle as an aeceptor to the reaetor with the given funetions as 
eallbaeks (login and error). An aeceptor bypass the message mecanism of the 
Reaetor and thus has to manage the messages by itself. 
=eut 
sub add_aeceptor { 
} 
my ($th , $iogin ,  $error)=@_; 
$ readh->add($fh); 
$errorh->add($fh); 
$aeceptor{$fh } ->{ "login" } = $log in ;  
$aeceptor{$fh }-> { "error" } = $error; 
=item destroy_handle ( HAN DLE ) 
Remove the given handle from the Reaetor. This includes the queue of messages 
to be sent. That means that once a handle is destroyed, any queued messages 
are simply disearded. 
=eut 
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delete $fh_callbacks{ $fh} if exists $fh_callbacks{ $fh} ;  
delete $fh_queues{ $fh} if exists $fh_queues{ $fh} ;  
delete $cu rrent{ $fh} if exists $cu rrent{$fh} ;  
delete $acceptor{ $fh} if exists $acceptor{$fh} ;  
= item remove_handle ( HAN DLE ) 
Remove the given handle from the Reactor, but will empty the message queue 
first . Once the handle is removed from the Reactor, it can ' t  be listened on . 
=eut 
sub remove_handle { 
} 
my ($fh) =(Q_ ; 
$readh->remove ($fh) ; 
$errorh->remove ($fh) ; 
delete $fh_eallbaeks{$fh} if exists $fh_eallbaeks{$fh} ; 
delete $eurrent {$fh} if exists $eurrent{$fh} ; 
delete $aeeeptor{$fh} if exists $aeeeptor{$fh} ; 
=item add_event ( TIME , FUNC ) 
See add_event in Timer . pm 
=eut 
sub add · event { 
$timer->add_event ((Q_) ; 
} 
=item remove_event ( TIME , FUNC ) 
See remove_event in Timer . pm 
=eut 
sub remove· event { 
$t imer->remove_event ((Q_) ; 
=item send_message ( HANDLE , MSG [ ,  FUNC] ) 
Put the given message (as a string) in the queue for the given handle and 
return . The message will be sent whenever it is possible . Bloeking is not 
supported . The funetion , if provided , is the eallbaek error funetion . 
=eut 
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} 
my ($fh , $mesg , $error) =©_ ; 
$mesg=pack ( ' N ' , length($mesg) ) . $mesg ; 
push ©{$fh_queues{$fh} } ,  [$mesg , $error] ; 
$writeh->add($fh) ; 
=item loop ( ) 
The main loop . It has to be called so that I/0 and time operations can occur . 
If no event is scheduled then the function will only poll the handles and 
return if nothing can be done . It should be used in a B<while ( 1 ) >  loop . 
=back 
=eut 
sub loop { 
48 
my $next_event ; 
my $timeout ; 
my $fh ; 
my $select ; 
my ($rset , $wset , $eset ) ; 
while ( 1 )  { 
$select=O ; 
$next_event=$timer->get_when() ; 
if (defined $next_event) { 
$timeout=$next_event-time () ; 
} else { 
$timeout=O ; 
} 
($rset , $wset , $eset ) =IO : : Select : : select ($readh , 
$writeh , 
$errorh , 
$timeout) ;  
foreach $fh (©$rset ) { 
_read ($fh) ; 
$select=! ; 
} 
foreach $fh (©$wset) { 
_write ($fh) ; 
$select=! ; 
} 
foreach $fh (©$eset) { 
_error ($fh) ; 
$select=! ;  
} 
$next_event=$timer->get_when() ; 
# i t may have changed 
if ($next_event) { 
if ($next_event-time () <=O) { 
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} 
} 
shift Otmp ; 
foreach ( Otmp) { 
&;$_ ; 
} 
return unless $select ; 
} 
} 
=head1 CALLBACK PROTOTYPES 
=over 4 
=item read ( HANDLE , STRING ) 
The handle is the one on which the message has been read , and the string is 
the message . 
=item close ( HANDLE ) 
The handle is the closed one . 
=item error ( HANDLE ) 
The handle is the one on which an error has been detected . 
=back 
=eut 
# Pri vate methods 
# _read is called when a f ile handle is readable .  When the message has been 
# read , the callback is called . If an error occurs , it will simply call 
# _errors . 
# As the reading could be done in several steps , _read stores i ts state in the 
# f ile handler . 
# If anything can be read in a call , but that the connection is closed while 
# we ' re reading, it will be detected at next call. 
# The error handling is at best weak. It has almost no recovery of lost or 
# partial messages at all. 
sub _read { 
my ($fh)=@_; 
if (exists $acceptor{$fh}) { 
} 
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} 
my $mesg; 
my $read_stuff; # Did we read anything in this call 
if(exists $current{$fh}) { 
$msg_len= $current{$fh } ->{  "msg_len" } ;  
$mesg = $current{$fh } ->{ "mesg"} ;  
} else { 
my $buff; 
$bytes_read=sysread($fh, $buff, 4, O); 
if(defmed $bytes_read) { 
if($bytes_read= =O) { 
&{$fh_callbacks{$fh }->{"close" } }($fh); 
return; 
} else { 
} 
} else { 
$msg_len=unpack( ' N ' ,  $buff); 
$mesg = " " ; 
$ read_stuff= l ;  




while($bytes_read=sysread($fh, $mesg, $msg_len, 
} 
length($mesg))) { 
$read_stuff= l ;  
$msg_len- = $bytes_read; 
last if $msg_len= =0; 
if(!defmed $bytes_read) { 
$current{ $fh } ->{ "mesg"} =$mesg ; 
$current{$fh } ->{ "msg_len"} =$msg-1en; 
&{$fh_callbacks{$fh }->{ "error" } }($fh); 
return; 
} elsif($msg_len= = O) { 
delete $current{$fh} ; 
& {$fh_callbacks{$fh}-> {"read"}  }($fh,$mesg); 
return; 
} elsif(!defined $read_stuff) { 
# We did not read anything on this call, so the connection is 
# closed. 
&{$fh_callbacks{$fh } -> { "close" }  }($fh); 
return; 
} else { 
} 
$current{$fh }->{"mesg"} =$mesg ; 
$current{$fh } -> { "msg_len"} =$msg-1en; 
# _write is called when a file handle is writable. lt will push as much as it 
# can in the file handle and update the message queue. If an error occurs, it 
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sub _write { 
my ($th)=@_; 350 
my $bytes_written; 
my $mesg = $th_queues{$th}->[0]->[0] ; 
my $error=$th_queues{$th}-> [0]->[1 ] ;  
while($bytes_written=syswrite($th, $mesg , length($mesg))) { 
$mesg = substr($mesg ,$bytes_written,-1  ); 
if($mesg eq " ") { 
shift @{ $th_queues{ $th} } ;  







$th_queues{$th } -> [0] -> [0J = $mesg; 
if(!defined $bytes_written) { 
} 
&error($th) if $error; 
shift @{$th_queues{$th} } ;  # we clean the message queue. 
$writeh->remove($th); 
# _error just dispatch to the given callback 




if (exists $acceptor{$th}) { 
&{$acceptor{$th } ->{ "error" } }($th); 
} else { 
&{$fh_callbacks{$fh }->{ "error" } }($fh); 
} 
=headl BUGS 
The module will block to read the size of a message (a 4 bytes long integer). 
If no more than 3 bytes are sent, the module freezes. This is not fun to fix. 
=headl AUTHOR 
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A.3 .  Service.pm 
The Service Module provides the base class for all Services. They are extensions 
for the Channel objects. They can be activated (called on each message, sent or 
received). Services can also generate their own messages. The application should 
not see th ose. 
# Package Service 
# 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Service.pm 
Service - provides the base class for extensions to the Channel abjects 
=headl SYNOPSIS 










=item new ( [ STRING ] ) 




sub new { 





if (@_) { 40 
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$name = shift @_; 
} else { 
$name = $pkg; 




my $seff= { "name" = >$name} ; 
return bless $self, $pkg; 
=headl METHODS 
=over 4 
=item read ( CHAN NEL, STRI NG, . . .  ) 
read takes the channel and the read message to process, and any number of other 
arguments of any kind (these are the options). It returns the processed 
message, or undef if the message has completely been handled. 
=eut 
sub read { 
} 
my ($self,$chan ,$mess,@options)=@_; 
return $mess; # The default behaviour is to do nothing 
=item send ( CHAN N EL, STRING, STRING, . . .  ) 
send takes the channel sending the message and the message to process, the 
original message (the one given to the Channel->send function) and any number 
of other arguments of any kind. It returns the processed message, or undef if 
the message has directly been sent. 
= eut 
sub send { 
} 
my ($self, $chan, $mess, $orig_mess, @options)=@_; 
return $mess; 
=item activate ( CHAN NEL, . . .  ) 
activate allows the given Channel to use the Service implicitely. Any number of 
other arguments of any kind can be added (these are the default options) . 
=eut 
sub activate { 
my ($self, $chan, @options)=@_; 
if ($seff->_inserLsend_hook($chan->{ "send_hook1" })) { 
$chan-> { "read_hook1" } = 
} 
} 
$self-> _insert_read_hook($chan->{ "read_hook1 " } ); 
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=item deactivate ( ) 
deactivate removes the Service from the list of implicitely called Services of 
the given Channel. It always succeeds. 
=eut 
sub deactivate { 
my ($self, $chan)=@_; 
$self-> _remove_send_hook($chan-> { "  send_hook1 " }  ); 
$chan->{ "read_hook1 "} = $self->..remove_read_hook($chan->{ "read_hook1 " }  ); 
} 
=item close ( CHAN N EL ) 
close may be called by the Channel when the handle has been closed. The default 
action is to deactivate the Service. 
=eut 
sub close { 
} 
my ($self, $chan)=@_; 
$self->deactivate($chan); 
=item error ( CHAN NEL ) 
error may be called by the Channel when there is an error on the handle. The 
default action is to deactivate the service. 
=eut 
sub error { 
my ($self, $chan)=@_; 
$self->deactivate($chan); 
} 
=item destroy ( CHANNEL ) 
destroy will be called when the Channel is destroyed. 
=back 
=eut 
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= headl PRIVATE FU N CTIONS 
=over 4 
= item _inserLsend_hook ( LISTREF ) 
_inserLsend_hook takes the correct send_hook (1 or 2), add the Service 
to it and return 1 .  If the service is already in it, it returns O. 
= eut 
sub _inserLsend_hook { 
} 
my ($self, $send_hook)=@_; 
foreach (@$send_hook) { 
return O if ($_ = = $self-> { "name" }); 
} 
push @$send_hook, $self->{ "name " } ;  
return 1 ;  
= item _inserLread_hook ( STRI NG [, STR I NG ] ) 
_inserLread_hook will take the correct read_hook (1 or 2) and a string to 
be added to the read_hook (if null, the name of the Service will be used) . 
It add the Service to it, and retum the new read_hook. 
The braces {} are added here. 
= eut 
sub _inserLread_hook { 
} 
my ($self,$ read_hook,$stri ng) = @_; 
$stri ng = $self-> { " name " }  unless $string; 
return $ read_hook. " { " .$string . " } " ;  
= item _remove_send_hook ( LISTREF ) 
_remove_send_hook will remove the Service name from the list reference. 
= eut 
sub _remove_send_hook { 
my ($self, $send_hook) = @_; 
@$send_hook = grep { $_  ne $self-> { "name " }  } @$send_hook; 
} 
= item _remove_read_hook ( STRING ) 
_remove_read_hook will remove the Service options (the first one if there are 
several Service options for the same Service) from the given string and 
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= back 
= eut 
sub _remove_read _hook { 
} 
my ($self, $ read_hook) = @_; 
if ($ read_hook=-/{$self-:-> { "name" }([� {J *)}/) { 
return $ •  . $ ' ; 
} 
return $read_hook ; 
=head1 CLASS FONCTIONS 
=over 4 
=item extract_service ( STRING ) 
extract_service f irst checks for the presence of a Service related data at 
the start of the message , and if there is one , removes it and splits it to · 
an array . It returns an array with the message , then the Service data array 
(may be empty) . 
=eut 
sub extra et· service { 
} 
=back 
my $mess = shift ©_ ; 
my ©service ; 
if ($mess=~/ � { ( [� {] •) } ( . •) $/) { 
$mess=$2 ; 
©service=split /\s+/ , $ 1 ;  
} 
return ( $mess ,  ©service) ; 
=head1 AUTHOR 










The application deals mainly with Channel objects. Messages are sent or received 
through Channels. Any number of Services can be added and activated. 
# Package Channel 
# 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Channel . pm 
Channel - each Channel object manages a communication channel (hence the name) 
=headl SYNOPSIS 
The purpose of a Channel object is to manage a communication channel with 
another Channel object through sockets , and to provide several Services (see 
below) on this channel . 
Services are extensions to the basic send-receive mechanism . Basic Services 
include Ping and Ack .  Others (such as encryption , configuration) can be added 
easily .  
=eut 
package Channel ; 
use strict ; 
use Reactor ;  
use Service ; 
use vars qw (%fhmap) ; 
# Private variable 
my 1/.fhmap ; 
sub · 1ogin ; 
sub · read ; 
sub · c1ose ; 
sub ·error ; 
# map file handle to the corresponding Channel object 
# login function for acceptors 
# main read function 
# main close function 
# main error function 
=headl CONSTRUCTOR 
=over 4 
=item new ( HANDLE , FU NC , FUNC , FUNC ) 
Creates a new Channel object with the given functions as read , close and error 
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sub new { 
} 
my ($ pkg , $fh , $read , $close , $error) =<O ' ; 
Reactor :  : add ' handle ( $fh , \&' read , \&' close , \&. error) ; 
my $self={"handle" = > $fh, # file handle 
"read" = > $ read , # read callback 
" close " = >$close, # close callback 
"error" = > $error, # error callback 
" services" = > {} ,  # services dictionary 
"mess_id" = >1 , # next message id; 
" send_hookl " = > [] ,  # high Jevel filters (only for msg) 
11 send_hook2" = > [ J ,  # Jow Jevel filters ( mandatory on this 
# Channel) 
"read_hook2" = > 11 11 , # This string will be added in front 
# of each received message. 
"read_hookl " = > 11 11 , # This string will be added in front 
# of each received message unless 
} ;  
$fhmap{$fh} = $self; 
retum bless $self, $pkg ;  
# they are processed by a Service. 
# Activated Services can use it to 
# called when a message for the 
# application is received. 
=item new_acceptor ( HAN DLE, FUNC, FUNC, FUNC, FUNC, FU N C ) 
Creates a new acceptor Channel with the given function as error callback. The 
next three functions are the read, close and error callbacks of new Channels 
created by the acceptor. The last one is the init function that will be called 
on each new Channel. 
=eut 




my ($ pkg , $fh , $error, $new_read, $new_close, $new_error, $ i n it)= @_; 
Reactor::add_acceptor($fh , \ &_login, \ &_error); 
my $self= { "handle " = > $fh, 
} ;  
" log in" =>\ &-1ogin, 
"error" = >\&_error, 
"new_read" = > $new_read ,  
"new_close" = > $ new_close, 
"new_error" = > $ new_error, 
" ini t "  = >$ i n it, 
$fhmap{$fh} = $self; 







= headl  M ETHODS 
=over 4 
=item send ( STRI NG, . . . .  ) 
send takes the message to be sent, and a list of Services options. Each Service 
option is a (reference to a) list, composed of the Service ' s name and the 
options . A Service can take the message out of the Channel by returning undef 
to its send call . 
=eut 
sub send { 
} 
my ($self , $mess , Oservice) = O_ ; 
my %local_serv ; 
my $orig_mess=$mess ; 
foreach (Oservice) { 
$local_serv{shift 0$_}=$_ 
} 
my %first_serv=$self->_filter_serv (%local_serv) ; 
# We first select the services that are not in send_hook1 or send_hook2 . 
foreach (keys %first_serv) { 
} 
$mess=$self-> { "services"}->{$_}->send($self , 
return unless $mess ; 
$mess , 
$orig_mess , 
©{$first_serv{$_}} ) ; 
my ©local_stack=©{$self-> { "send_hook1 " } } ; 
foreach (©local_stack) { 
} 
if (exists $local_serv{$_}) { 




©{$local_serv{$_}} ) ;  
delete $local_serv{$_} ; 
} else { 
$mess=$self->{ "services"}-> 
{$_}->send($self , 
$mess ,  
$orig_mess) ; 
} 
return unless $mess ; 
$self->_low_send($mess , $orig_mess ,%local_serv) ; 







A. Source code 
get_mess_id returns a different integer each times it is called . It may be 
used by Services f or tagging some messages . 
=eut 
sub get · messïd { 
my $self =shift ©_ ; 
return $ self-> { "mess_id" }++ ; 
} 
=item destroy ( ) 
destroy will remove the handle from the Reactor and clean everything else . 
=eut 
sub destroy { 
my $self = shift ©_ ; 
delete $fhmap{$self-> { "handle" } } ; 
Reactor : : destroy_handle($self->{ "handle" } ) ; 
foreach (keys %{$self -> { " services" } } )  { 
$self-> { " services" }->{$_}->destroy ($self) ; 
} 
} 
=item add_service ( SERVICE ) 
Add the gi ven Service . 
=back 
=eut 
sub add·service { 
my ($self , $serv) =©_ ; 
my $name=$serv-> { "name " } ; 
$self-> { "  services" } -> {  $name }=$serv ; 
} 
=headl ATTRIBUTES 
The attributes are not meant to be used by the applicat ion . They are normally 
reserved for the Services . 
=over 4 
=item send_hookl 
This list is for activated Services that should be called on each message sent 








opt ions . 
=item send_hook2 
This list is for activated Services that should be called for each messages on 
this Channel .  Keep in mind that a Service can generate messages too . 
=item read_hook1 
This is a string where activated Services can put a Service option (a string 
that will be recognized by Services) . This string will be added in front of 
each message received for the application (but not for the messages already 
handled by a Service) . 
=item read_hook2 
This is a string where activated Services can put a Service option . This string 
will be added in front of each recei ved message . 
=eut 
# _login creates a new f ile handle with accept ()  and a new Channel with this 
# handle 
sub · 1ogin { 
} 
my $fh=shift ©_ ; 
my $self=$fhmap{$fh} ; 
my $new_fh=$fh->accept () ; 
my $new_fh=new Channel ( $new_fh , 
$self->{"new_read" } ,  
$self->{ "new_close" } , 
$self-> { "new_error " } ) ; 
&{$self-> { " init " } } ($new_fh) ; 
# _fil ter _serv takes a hash of Services options , and removes those whose name 
# is in send_hook1 or send_hook2 
sub · fil ter '  serv { 
} 
my ($self , ¼serv) =©_ ; 
my ¼result ; 
my $key ; 
foreach $key (keys ¼serv) { 
unless ( (grep { $key eq $_ } ©{$self-> { " send_hook1 " } } )  
} 
} 
or (grep { $key eq $_ } ©{$self-> { " send_hook2" } }  ) ) { 
$result{$key}=$serv{$key} ; 







A. Source code 
# _service parse the message , extract the f irst Service data and gives it to 
# the proper function . 
sub · service { 
} 
my ($self , $mess) =©_ ; 
my ©service ; 
($mess , ©service) =Service : : extract_service ($mess) ; 
return $mess unless ©service ; 
$mess=$self-> { " services" } -> {  shift ©service } ->read ($self , 
$mess , 
©service) ; 
return $mess ; 
# _read is called by the Reactor . It checks for services calls , and if the 
# message has not been handled by a Service , it calls the read callback . 
sub · read { 
my ( $fh , $mess) =©_ ; 
my $self=$fhmap{$fh} ; 
$mess=$self->{ "read_hook2" } . $mess ; 
my $new_mess=$mess ; 
do { 
$mess=$new_mess ; 
$new_mess=_service ($self , $mess) ; 
} unt il ($new_mess eq $mess) ;  
if ( $mess) { # if the message has not yet been handled 
# by a Service 




$new_mess=_service ($self , $mess) ; 
} unt il ($new_mess eq $mess) ; 
&{$self->{ "read " } }  ($mess) ; 
} 
} 
# _close and _error are called by the Reactor . They f ind the appropriate 
# channel , and call the appropria te callback 
sub · c1ose { 
} 
my ( $fh) = shift ©_ ; 
my $chan=$fhmap{$fh} ; 
&{$chan-> { " close"}}  ($chan) ; 
sub ·error { 
62 
my ($fh) = shift ©_ ; 
my $chan=$fhmap{$fh} ; 







A. 4. Channel. pm 
} 
# _low_send send the message through the low level (and mandatory) f ilters 
# and f inally to the Reactor . A Service can remove the message from the 
# Channel by returning undef from i ts send call . 
sub · low· send { 
} 
1 .  1 
=back 
my ($self , $mess , $orig_mess , ¼local_serv) = ©_ ; 
my ©local_stack=©{$self-> { "send_hook2"}} ; 
foreach (©local_stack) { 
} 
if (exists $local_serv{$_} ) { 
$mess=$self->{"  services "}-> 
{$_}->send($self , 
$mess ,  
$orig_mess , 
©{$local_serv{$_}} ) ;  
delete $local_serv{$_} ; 






return unless $mess ; 
Reactor : : send_message ($self->{ "handle" } , 
$mess , 
$orig_mess) ; 
# no error callback here . We ' ll deal 
# with this through the normal error 
# callback. 
=headl CALLBACK PROTOTYPES 
=over 4 
=item read ( STRING ) 
read does not take an Channel argument because it is the boundary between the 
Channel and the application. I f  a message must be handled internally by the 
Channel, it is best left to a Service (read callbacks for Services have a 
Channel argument). 
=item close ( CHAN NEL ) 







A. Source code 
foreach (@{$seef-> { "services" }) { $_->close($seef); } 
or destroy itself (that will automatically call destroy on the Services). 
=item error ( CHAN NEL ) 
If the error cannot be fixed, the same operations as for close should be done. 
=item init ( CHAN N EL ) 




There is no intern configuration mechanism for the Services, which means that a 
Channel could receive an unmanageable message (that is, it has not the correct 
Service to handle it, making it crash). An external Configuration Service can 
fixe this. 
=headl AUTHOR 
Frederic Dumont <fdumont@info.fundp.ac.be> 
=eut 
A. 5 .  Service:: Trace. pm 
The Service: :Trace module is an example of a somewhat useful Service. Once acti­
vated, it will print on the standard output each message received for the applica­
tion. 
# Package Service:: Trace 
# 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Trace.pm 
Trace - provides an easy way to print each messages for or from the 
application. 
=headl SYNOPSIS 






A. 5. Service:: Trace.pm 
=eut 






=item read ( CHAN NEL, STRING ) 
read takes the channel and the read message to process. It prints the message 
on the standard output then retum the message. 
=eut 
sub read { 
} 
my ($seef,$chan,$mess)= @_; 
print "Trace : "  ,$mess, 11\n" ;  
retum $ mess; 
= item send ( CHANNEL, STRI NG, STRING ) 
send does the same thing as read, but for outbound messages. 
= eut 
sub send { 
} 
my ($seef,$chan,$mess, $orig_mess)=@_; 
print "Trace : " ,$orig_mess, "\n" ;  
retum $ mess; 
=item activate ( CHANNEL ) 
Eaeh message will be printed on the standard output. It uses the 
Channel->read_hookl to be called on each read message, and the 
Channel->send_hookl to be called on each sent message. 
=eut 
= item deactivate ( ) 
deaetivate removes the Service from the list of implicitely called Services of 








A. Source code 
1 .  ' 
=back 
=headl AUTHOR 
Frederic Dumont <fdumont@info.fundp.ac.be> 
=eut 
A.6 .  Service:: Ping . pm 
The Service:: Ping module shows how to use the JowJevel function of the Channel 
abjects. It can also be used to verify that the peer is still alive (that is, not frozen). 
The implementation is somewhat complex: due to the fact that this abject takes 
any kind of message received from the peer as a proof that it is still alive. So it 
uses Channel-i,read_hook2 to be called each time a message arrives. 
# Package Service::Trace 
# 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Ping.pm 
Ping - ping the peer to detect bad behaviour 
=headl SYNOPSIS 
The Ping Service can be used to detect frozen peers. Once activated, it pings 
the peer, and wait for an answer. If none are given, it triggers the timeout 
callback. If an answer is received, it pings again. 
=eut 




=headl M ETHODS 
=item activate ( CHANNEL, I NT, I NT, FUNC ) 
The Ping object will start to send ping messages to the peer, wait for an 
answer, and ping again. If no answer cornes back before Ping->timeout seconds, 





A .6. Service::Ping.pm 
service will takes this for an evidence that peer is alive, and will be put 30 
on hold for an idle number of seconds before sending the next ping. 
The arguments are the Channel on which it is activated, the idle time (the time 
between a ping reply and the next ping), the timeout tune (the tune to wait 
before triggering the timeout callback function) and the timeout callback 
function. 
=eut 
sub activate { 
} 
my ($self, $chan, $idle, $timeout, $cbfunc)=@_; 
$self->{$chan } ->{ "  idle" }  = $idle; 
$self->{$chan } ->{ "timeout " }  = $timeout; 
$self->{ $chan } ->{"  cbfunc" }  = $cbfunc; 
$self->{$chan} ->{"ping_func" }  = sub { _ping($self,$chan); } ; 
$self->{$chan}->{ "next_ping"} =timeQ+$idle; 
$chan-> { "read_hook2" } =  
$self->_insert_read_hook($chan->{"read_hook2" }, 
$self->{"name"} . "  REPL"); 
Reactor: :add_event($self->{$chan}->{"next_ping"}, 
$self->{$chan } ->{ "ping_func" }  ); 
=item deactivate ( ) 
The Ping abject will not ping anymore. 
= eut 
sub deactivate { 
} 
my ($self, $chan) = @_; 
if (exists $self-> {$chan} ->{ "next_timeout"}) { 
Reactor: :remove_event($self->{$chan}->{"next_timeout" }, 
$self->{$chan}->{" cbfunc" }); 
} 
if (exists $self->{$chan} ->{"next_ping"}) { 
Reactor: :remove_event($self->{$chan}->{ "next_ping" }, 
$self->{$chan }->{"ping_func" }  ); 
} 
delete $self-> {$chan} ;  
$chan-> { "read_hook2" } = 
$self->_remove_read_hook($chan->{ "read_hook2" }); 
=item read ( CHANN EL, STR I NG [, STR ING ] ) 
The first string (the message) is returned, and the second string 








A. Source code 
sub read { 
} 
my ($self, $chan, $mess, $option) = @_; 
if (! defmed $option) { 
} 
my $mess= " { " . $self->{ "name"}. " REPL}" ;  
$chan->_low_send($mess,$mess); 
if (exists $self->{$chan} ->{"next_timeout"}) { 
} 
Reactor: :remove_event($self-> {$chan} -> { "next_ timeout" } ,  
$self->{$chan}->{"cbfunc" }); 
delete $self->{$chan}->{"next_timeout" } ;  
if (exists $self-> {$chan} ->{ "next_ping"}) { 
Reactor: :remove_event($self-> {$chan} -> { "next_ping"} ,  
$self->{$chan }->{ "ping_func"}  ); 
} 
$self->{$chan } ->{ "next_ping"} =timeQ+ $self->{$chan }-> { " idle " } ;  
Reactor::add_event($self->{$chan}->{ "next_ping"} ,  
$self->{$chan}->{ "ping_func" }); 
retum $ mess; 
sub destroy { 
} 
my ($self, $chan) = @_; 
$self->deactivate($chan); 
delete $self->{$chan} ;  
# _ping: the low level function used in closure to send pings. 
sub _ping { 
} 
1 1 
my ($self, $chan)=@_; 
my $mess = " { "  .$self->{"name"}. " } " ;  
my $time=timeQ+ $self-> {$chan}->{"timeout"} ;  
$self-> {$chan }-> {"next_ timeout " }  =$time; 
Reactor: :add_event($time,$self->{$chan}->{"cbfunc"}); 
$chan->_low_send($mess,$mess); 
= headl CALLBACK PROTOTYPES 
=item timeout ( ) 
The timeout callback function takes no arguments. 
=back 







A. 7. Service: :Ack. pm 
Frederic Dumont <fdumont@info.fundp.ac.be> 
=eut 
A. 7. Service::Ack.pm 
The Service: :Ack can be called on sent messages to request that a confirmation of 
reception by peer be sent. It is useful because some messages are too important 
to be lost if the crash of the peer is discovered after the messages have been sent. 
With Service: :Ack, those messages can be sent to an alternative location. 
# Package Service::Ack 
# 
# Frederic Dumont, 1 998-1 999 
=headl Ack.pm 
Ack - send a message with a demand for confirmation 
=headl SYNOPSIS 
Ack is invoked in Channel->send to request that a confirmation be sent by the 
peer. If that confirmation is not received within a given amount of time, 






= headl METHODS 
=over 4 
=item read ( CHAN NEL, STRI NG, I NT [, STRING ] ) 
read takes the channel, the read message to process, and the message id. The 
optional string indicates this is a answer. If not, it replies with this 
message id. 
=eut 
sub read { 
my ($self ,$chan,$mess, $id, $ack)=@_; 





A. Source code 
} 
if (exists $self->{$chan}->{$id}) { 
Reactor::remove_event($self-> {$chan}-> 
} 
{ $ id}-> { "timeout " } ,  
$self->{$chan }-> 
{$ id}-> {"timeout_func" }); 
delete $self->{$chan}->{$ id} ;  
} else { 
} 
my $new_mess= u { "  . $self->{ "name" } . "  " . $ id . " ACK} " ;  
$chan->_low_send($new_mess,$new_mess); 
retum $ mess; 
= item send ( CHANNEL, STRI NG, STRI NG, I NT, FU NC ) 
send uses the provide function as timeout callback, and the integer as the 
timeout period .  
=eut 




my ($self,$chan,$mess, $orig_mess, $timeout, $func)=@_; 
my $id = $chan->geLmess_idQ; 
$mess = " { "  . $self-> {"name" } . "  $id} " .$mess; 
$self-> { $chan } -> {$ id}-> {"timeout " }  =timeQ+ $timeout; 
$self-> { $chan }->{$id} ->{ "timeout_func" }  = 
sub { &$func($chan ,$orig_mess); } ;  
Reactor::add_event($self->{$chan }->{$ id}-> { "timeout " } ,  
$self->{$chan }->{$ id}->{  "timeout_func" }  ); 
retum $ mess; 
sub destroy { 
my ($self, $chan) = @_; 
foreach (keys %{$self->{$chan}}) { 
Reactor::remove_event($self->{$chan}-> {$-} -> { "timeout " } ,  
$self->{$chan } ->{$_}-> {  "timeout_func" }  ); 
delete $self->{$chan} ->{$-} ; # just to make sure we don 't 
# leave any circular 
# dependencies 
} 
delete $self->{$chan} ;  
} 







A. 7. Service: :Ack. pm 
# Somewhat radical, but as a default action at least it is conservative (no 
# timeout callback will be called.) 90 
sub deactivate { 
my $self=shift @_; 
$self->destroy(@_); 
} 
sub close { 
1 .  ' 
my $self=shift @_; 
$self->destroy(@_); 
=headl CALLBACK PROTOTYPES 
=over 4 
=item timeout ( CHANNEL, STR ING ) 
The timeout function takes the Channel and the original message. 
=headl AUTHOR 
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